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SOME PROBLEMS OF CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS1
Joirn Krah7ner'
A S a procedural device the class action has a respectably long his-
tory2 and, from its beginnings, has been recognized as an action
founded at least as much upon convenience as upon legal theory.3 In-
terestingly enough, it was the insistence of the early equity courts on the
convenient administration of justice that led to the general rule requiring
all parties interested in the subject matter of a suit to be joined before
the suit could go forward, and this rule presented the first barrier to the
maintenance of a class suit. As Professor Chafee has pointed out, the
early judges, concerned about "the possibility that the bill might be
defective for nonjoinder of necessary parties," 4 worried little, if at
all, about the binding effect on absentees of a decree in a class suit if
the bill was maintained.5 The first hurdle, then, which the class suit had
to clear was the general rule of convenience on joinder of parties. The
clearing was not long in coming, resting not on complex grounds but
on the same ground as the original rule. As Lord MacNaghten said in
summarizing the development:
Under the old practice the Court required the presence of all par-
ties interested in the matter in suit, in order that a final end might be
made of the controversy. But when the parties were so numerous that
you never could 'come at justice,' to use an expression in one of the
older cases, if everybody interested was made a party, the rule was
not allowed to stand in the way. It was originally a rule of con-
venience: for the sake of convenience it was relaxed. Given a common
Associate Professor of Law and Assistant Dean, Texas Tech University, 1971-72.
B.A., University of Iowa, 1965; J.D., 1966; LL.M., Harvard University, 1967. Assistant
Professor of Law, University of South Carolina, 1967-70; Associate Professor of Law,
University of South Carolina, 1970-71.
1 To those familiar with Professor Chafee's writings, this tide may seem pretentious,
deriving as it does from his outstanding book, SoME, PaoBLEMs OF EQUITY. The use of
a similar title here may be forgiven, I hope, on two grounds. First, it is at least descriptive
and, second, it is intended as a tribute to a master's writings on equity where class
actions began.
2 No precise date can be fixed, but somewhere between 1675 and 1700 class actions
seem to have begun a definite branching off from bills of peace. See Z. CMaOTE, SOME
PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 157-66 (1950) and cases there cited, especially in n. 29 (hereinafter
cited as CHArmE).
3 CH"waE 200-04.
4 CaAaEE 204.
5 CHAFEs 203.
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interest and a common grievance, a representative suit was in order if
the relief sought was in its nature beneficial to all whom the plaintiff
proposed to represent ....
I think the rule as to representative suits remains very much as it
was a hundred years ago. From the time it was first established it has
been recognized as a simple rule resting merely upon convenience. 6
Once it had been determined that a class suit could be maintained
as an exception to the general rule of party joinder, the English judges
gave some consideration to the problem of binding unjoined members
of the class. However, in England, binding a person who did not have
his day in court was not as important a question as it is to us under the
due process clause. Thus, generally, if the class suit did not fail for
non-joinder of necessary parties, any decree rendered would be bind-
ing on those not joined. In the United States, this second question of
the binding effect of a decree has been more difficult;8 however, with
the new draft of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, it
has been workably laid to rest along the lines proposed by Chafee in
1950 as an alternative to the then-existing Rule 23; which created three
categories of class suits commonly termed "true," "hybrid" and "spuri-
ous." ' Chafee proposed to divide class suits in a way which was func-
'tionally more workable with reference to the binding effect of a
decree.10 His division was a two-part one, described in his words as
"Solid Class Suits" and "Invitations to Come In." Solid Class Suits were
those in which the unifying factors among class members were strong,
e.g., important common questions, a lack of distinctive individual in-
terests, and close identification of the interests of the unnamed persons
with the interests of the representatives.
Invitations to Come In were to be used in suits that, while having
some common questions and some unifying factors, also had class mem-
6 Duke of Bedford v. Ellis, [1901] A.C. 1, 8-10 (1900).
7 CHAFEE 225.
8The historical development is summarized in CHA= 225-30.
9The text of both the old Rule 23 and the new Rule 23 is set out as an Appendix
-to this article. The new Rule became effective on July 1, 1966.
10For a detailed discussion of the proposal which is summarized here, see CaA1r.z
259-75. Chafee was not alone in his dissatisfaction with the old Rule 23, as the extensive
literature indicates. See, e.g., Kalven & Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the
Class Suit, 8 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 684 (1941); Keeffe, Levy & Donovan, Lee Defeats Ben
Hur, 33 CoRNELL L.Q. 327 (1948); Note, Federal Class Actions: A Suggested Revision
of Rule 23, 46 CoLUM. L. Rsv. 819 (1946).
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bers with distinctive individual interests that required assertion. Chafee
considered actions under the Fair Labor Standards Act particularly
suitable for Invitations to Come In. In his view, this category of actions
was "like being asked to a cocktail party. Anybody who was asked
can come. Unless you do come, you get no cocktails. . ." 11
Under Chafee's division, the judgment in a Solid Class Suit would
be binding on all members of the class whether or not the result was
favorable. In actions where Invitations to Come In were used, judg-
ment, favorable or unfavorable, would be binding only on those who
accepted the invitation with no effect-on those who declined. The idea
that an outsider could sit on the sidelines and share in a victory without
being bound by a defeat was specifically rejected by Chafee as utterly
inconsistent with the principles of res judicata.12
In addition to proposing a new division for class suits, Chafee also
urged that the court determine early in the proceeding the classifica-
tion of a properly brought class suit, and exercise continuing supervision
of the action, including the sending of any Invitations to Come In (if
necessary), deciding the adequacy of representation, and overseeing
generally the conduct of the action for the protection of outsiders.
The present Rule 23 incorporates many of these suggestions,' 3 includ-
ing the simplified classification scheme for class suits.14 The Rule does,
however, make one change in the category of suits Chafee has termed
"Invitations to Come In" by attaching the addendum of "Regrets Only"
instead of "R.S.V.P." A class member need not "accept" the invitation,
but if he does not act affirmatively to send "regrets," his name will be
left on the "guest list" and he will be bound by any judgment handed
down.' r
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the class action began as a means
to further the "convenient administration of justice," and that same
quest has continued resulting at the federal level in a revised rule that
11 CHv'a 259.
1 2 CHAF E 280. The idea that outsiders could choose-after the litigation-to share in
the victory or stay out in case of defeat was originally proposed by Kalven and Rosen-
field in their article, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cm. L. RPv.
684 (1941). Despite Chafee's objections to this result, it became the rule in several
cases. See, e.g., Union Carbide & Carbon Corp. v. Nisley, 300 F.2d 561 (10th Cir.
1961), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 801 (1962); York v. Guaranty Trust Co., 143 F.2d 503
(2d Cir. 1944), res'd on other grounds, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
13 See FED. R. Cw. P. 23, especially -(c)(1), (c)(2), (d) and e).
141d. at (b), (c) (2) and c) (3).
Is id. at (c) (3).
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goes far toward making the class action a useful (and manageable) pro-
cedural device resting on sound theory. However, theory and practice
often diverge and there are clear indications that the class action as a
consumer protection device has fallen short of the original goal. This
article will examine some of the pitfalls that exist for consumer class
actions, at both the federal and state level, and will suggest some ways
by which these pitfalls might be avoided and a class action successfully
maintained.
Snyder v. Harris AND THE "No-AGGREGATION" RULE
One of the major difficulties with Rule 23, as presently applied, arises
from the very evil which the class action was designed to remedy-
a class with numerous members, each of whom has a claim too small to
justify litigation. Kalven and Rosenfield, writing in 1941, used the
Insull Utilities Investments cases as an example, and noted that "[t]he
investor who held, say, $10,000 in debentures, was confronted with
expenses measured by a $60,000,000 lawsuit, not a $10,000 one." 16
The situation is essentially the same today so far as the individual con-
sumer is concerned. His loss may well be small but the legal expenses
would be the same as if the action were for a much larger sum; in fact,
it is not uncommon for the legal expense actually to exceed the amount
of the original claim. Few people, if any, are willing (or able) to
act on principle when economic reality intervenes. Fraudulent operators
know this well, and evidence indicates that many of them refrain from
"cheating any one person out of large sums of money because they
realize that 'no one bilked out of fifty dollars is going to pay a lawyer
to get his money back.' " 18 On its face, a situation like this is a natural
one for the class action. If enough small claims can be presented in a
single action, the expenses can be shared and the litigation can proceed
at an escalated level commensurate with the total value. However, in
the federal arena, the Supreme Court has held, in the case of Snyder v.
Harris'9 that, despite the revision of Rule 23, the individual claims of
class members cannot be aggregated to meet the requirement of juris-
"16 Kalven and Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. Cmi.
L. REv. 684, 685 (1941).
17 S. REP. No. 1124, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1970).
18 Note, Translating Sympathy for Deceased Consumers Into Effective Programs for
Protection, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 395, 409 (1966).
19 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
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dictional amount 2° unless the claims are joint or common. Because
consumer claims are generally separate and distinct, the Snyder ruling
effectively precludes most consumer class actions in federal courts unless
Congress has waived the jurisdictional amount for the particular type
of claim asserted. It has been argued that the Snyder rule effectively
revives the old, technical categories formerly embodied in Rule 23
despite the obvious purpose of the amended rule to eradicate such a
classification scheme and replace it with a functional approach.,' How-
ever, whether or not the Snyder rule is correct, it is the present inter-
pretation of Federal Rule 23, and the consumer advocate must consider
it in framing his class action complaint.
LESSENING THE IMPACT OF Snyder v. Harris
On obvious way to avoid the Snyder rule is to fit the case, if pos-
sible, into a statute that does not require a jurisdictional amount. Of
course, this cannot be done in every consumer case, but there are lines of
development worth considering whenever a consumer class action under
Rule 23 is contemplated.
Perhaps the most significant of these developments is the discovery
of the antitrust laws by consumer groups.2 2 Prior to the amendment
of Rule 23 in 1966, relatively few consumer antitrust suits had been
brought.23 Since the amendment, consumer antitrust class actions have
increased dramatically and the trend shows no sign of abating.24 The
broad sweep of the antitrust laws forbids anti-competitive consumer
abuses such as price fixing,25 territorial division agreements, 2 and tying
20The two most common cases for federal jurisdiction, diversity of citizenship, 28
U.S.C. § 1332 (1970), and federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970), both
require that the amount in controversy exceed the sum or value of $10,000. However,
§ 1331 is subject to numerous exceptions and this can be of significant value to con-
sumers in some cases as discussed later in this article.
21 Bangs, Revised Rule 23: Aggregation of Claims for Achievement of Jurisdictional
Amount, 10 B.C. IND. & Com. L. REv. 601 (1969). The majority in the Snyder case
recognized that the "amendment to Rule 23 replaced the old categories with a func-
tional approach to class actions" but still decided against allowing aggregation. 394 U.S.
at 335.
22 The basic antitrust laws are, of course, the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970)
and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1970).
23ABA SECTION op AN'n-usT LAW, ANnTmusT DEVELOPMENTS, 1955-1968, at 274
(1968).
24See PLI FEDRAL CLAss AcnoN DI Grs (1971).
25 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940).
26 United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
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agreements, 27 as well as the more generalized wrongs of monopoly28
and attempts to monopolize.' Because such activities are antithetical to
free competition, a basic tenet of our society, treble damages are allowed
for antitrust violations, and the district courts are given original juris-
diction without regard to jurisdictional amount to encourage and facili-
tate private actions against public wrongs.30 Recent private antitrust
actions have included diverse claims such as suits against auto manu-
facturers for conspiring to delay the development and installation of
pollution control equipment in motor vehicles,"1 suits against drug
manufacturers for antitrust violations arising from the sale of antibi-
otics," and a counterclaim asserting a conspiracy to monopolize against
egg producers.3 Certainly, for the consumer advocate, the antitrust laws
constitute a potent weapon for particularly grave abuses, and the pos-
sibility of asserting an antitrust claim should always be explored.
Another possible method of opening the federal courthouse door
for small claims is available to correct practices violative of federal
constitutional rights. The most significant case of this type to appear
recently is Adams v. Egley,3 4 which held unconstitutional sections
9-503 and 9-504 of the California Uniform Commercial Code.35  (A
similar case in the same court, Posadas v. Star & Crescent Federal Credit
27 IBM Corp. v. United States, 298 U.S. 131 (1936).
28 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
29 Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).
30 U.S.C. § 1337 (1970) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action or proceeding
arising under any Act of Congress regulating commerce or protecting trade and
commerce against restraints and monopolies.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970) states:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of
anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court
of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found
or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover
threefold the damages by him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reason-
able attorney's fee.
For a discussion of the underlying policies of the antitrust laws, see C. KIAsri &
D. TURNER, ANTirRusr PoLicy (1959).
31 In re Motor Vehicle Air Pollution Control Equipment, 5 TRADE REG. REP. (1970
Trade Cas.) 73, 317 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
32West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
33 United Egg Producers v. Bauer Int'l Corp., 312 F. Supp. 319 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
34 338 F. Supp. 614 (S.D. Cal. 1972). At the same time Adams was being decided, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California reached the opposite
result on similar facts in Oiler v. Bank of America, Case No. C-70-2559 SW, 342 F.
Supp. 21 51,807 (N.D. Cal. 1972). This case is also on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
35 Sections 9-503 and 9-504 of the California Uniform Commercial Code were
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Union" was consolidated with Adams by stipulation). Adams was a
direct descendant of Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp.r in which the
Supreme Court invalidated the Wisconsin wage garnishment statute on
due process grounds. While Adams was not a class action, its jurisdic-
tional base is instructive. The plaintiff had financed the purchase of
three automobiles by executing a promissory note and security agree-
ment naming the Bank of LaJolla as payee and secured party. The
note and security agreement were ultimately acquired by the defendant,
Southern California National Bank. The plaintiff failed to make the
required payments and, when he fell 90 days past due, the defendant
Egley, acting on behalf of the bank, repossessed and sold two of the
vehicles under sections 9-503 and 9-504. The sale satisfied the re-
maining balance on the account. The consolidated Posadas case also
involved the repossession of a motor vehicle. In both cases the repos-
session was accomplished by private and peaceful means. Both plaintiffs
sought declaratory relief and damages, asserting that sections 9-503
and 9-504 were unconstitutional because the plantiffs had been de-
prived of property without due process of law and were denied equal
protection of the laws. Damages were based upon loss of business
opportunities, emotional distress, the loss of property by the reposses-
sion, and economic hardship resulting from the deprivation of the
property. Jurisdiction was based on federal question jurisdiction 8 and
the Civil Rights Acts39 (which require no jurisdictional amount in
controversy). On the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on the
issue of liability, the court upheld the claim of jurisdiction:
adopted without amendment from the Official 1962 text of the Uniform Commercial
Code. Section 9-503 provides:
Unless otherwise agreed a secured party has on default the right to take possession
of the collateral. In taking possession a secured party may proceed without
judicial process if this can be done without breach of the peace or may proceed
by action. If the security agreement so provides the secured party may require
the debtor to assemble the collateral and make it available to the secured party
at a place to be designated by the secured party which is reasonably convenient
to both parties. Without removal a secured party may render equipment un-
usable, and may dispose of collateral on the debtor's premise under Section
9-504.
Section 9-504 governs the manner and effect of the secured party's disposition of
collateral after repossession.
s6 Reported with Adams, 338 F. Supp. 614 (SD. Cal. 1972).
37395 US. 337 (1969).
38 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
39 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
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These Commercial Code sections set for a state policy, and the
security agreements upon which the instant actions rest, whose terms
are authorized by the statute and which incorporate its provisions, are
merely an embodiment of that policy. It is therefore apparent that
the acts of repossession were made "under color of state law" as re-
quired by the Civil Rights statutes, and that the passage of Sections
9503 and 9504 [sic], which authorize such acts are sufficient state
action to raise a federal question.4°
Having decided that the jurisdictional base was sound, the court
then proceeded to hold unconstitutional sections 9-503 and 9-504 on
the authority of a broad reading of the Sniadacb case. An appeal to
the Ninth Circuit filed by the bank is still pending. Even aside from
the very significant decision on sections 9-503 and 9-504, the Adams
case illustrates a jurisdictional base of great value to the consumer advo-
cate. A somewhat similar jurisdictional claim was used in Fuentes v. Fair-
cloth,41 a case now pending before the United States Supreme Court.4 1
The plaintiff there filed a class action in the Federal District Court for
the Southern District of Florida attacking as unconstitutional the Florida
replevin statute because it authorizes the taking of property by a
sheriff without due process of law and without a search warrant in
violation of the fourth amendment. The District Court held against
both of these contentions.4 Oral arguments in the Supreme Court have
been heard in the Fuentes case,42 but no opinion has yet been handed
down. Like Adams, Fuentes contains a closely intertwined mixture of
procedural and substantive law, and any decision of the Supreme Court
will, almost without doubt, be of great significance in the use of novel
jurisdictional bases in consumer actions in federal courts.
Section 43a of the Lanham Act 44 has been suggested elsewhere as
another possible ground of jurisdiction in federal courts for consumer
cases.45 However, the federal courts have been less than enthusiastic
40 338 F. Supp. 614, 618 (S.D. Cal. 1972).
41317 F. Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1970), prob. juris. noted, 401 U.S. 906 (1971).
41a After this article was written, the Fuentes case was affirmed by the United States
Supreme Court, and is reported as Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
42 317 F. Supp. 954.
43 40 U.S.L.W. 3233 (Nov. 16, 1971).
44 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1970).
45 Starts, The Conswmer Class Action-Part I: Consideration of Equity, 49 B.U.L.
Rav. 211, 244-47 (1969).
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about the use of section 43a, and it appears unlikely that a resort to
this section would be upheld.46
The Consumer Credit Protection Act,47 better known as Truth In
Lending, is still another potential source of consumer class actions in
the federal courts. Like the antitrust laws and the Civil Rights Act, no
jurisdictional amount is required and, for cases within its purview, the
Truth In Lending Act is an ideal basis for consumer class actions.48
A consumer advocate would be well advised to consult the provisions
of this act and its interpretive regulations whenever a claim presents
issues involving credit transactions or credit advertising to see if his
case falls within any of the numerous provisions of the statute.
PROBLEMS WITH SENDING "INITATIONS TO COME IN"
Another difficulty with the successful maintenance of a consumer
class action at the federal level under Rule 23 is the notice requirement
of 23 (c) (2):
In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under
the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can
be identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each
member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so
requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or
not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C)
any member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter
an appearance through his counsel.
46 Colligan v. Activities Club of New York, Ltd, 442 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1971); see
also the remarks of Professor Starrs on Section 43a in a later article, Continuing Com-
plexities in the Consumer Class Action 49 J. URBAN L. 349, 353 (1971).
47 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81 (1970).
4SThe Act provides inter alia in 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970) for civil liability:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, any creditor who fails in con-
nection with any consumer credit transaction to disclose to any person any
information required under this part to be disclosed to that person is liable
to that person in an amount equal to the sum of
(1) twice the amount of the finance charge in connection with the transaction,
except that the liability under this paragraph shall not be less than $100 nor
greater than $1,000; and
(2) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the
costs of the action together with a reasonable attorney's fee as determined
by the court.
(e) Any action under this section may be brought in any United States District
Court, or in any other court of competent jurisdiction, within one year from
the date of the occurrence of the violation.
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The subdivision (b) (3) referred to in the quoted provision is the
section of Rule 23 that will commonly include consumer class actions
for damages if the Snyder v. Harris rule is successfully avoided.49
If the language of subdivision (c) (2) means what it says about
"individual notice to all members who can be identified through reason-
able effort," the cost of such notice may be so great that the action can-
not go forward. Although there is some question about who should
bear the cost of notice, it seems generally agreed that the plaintiff, at
least initially, is the party responsible for the expense. 0 In some circum-
stances then, a representative with a small claim may find himself out of
court because of the cost of notifying his fellow class members about
the action. That these costs can be sizable is illustrated by the Second
Circuit case of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin.5" The plaintiff there had
a claim of approximately 70 dollars, but the class size was estimated at
3,750,000 and the cost of notice, based on this class size, would have
been approximately 400,000 dollars. The court interpreted subdivision
(c) (2) to require individual notice, and noted that if "financial con-
siderations prevent the plaintiff from furnishing notice to these mem-
bers, there may prove to be no alternative other than the dismissal of
the class suit." 52 Fortunately for the small claimant, some courts have
been more willing to approach the notice requirement pragmatically. a
As was said in the case of Dolgow v. Anderson,54 "[i]n view of the
inordinate expense that would be involved in locating and mailing notice
to tens of thousands of transitory shareholders, it would be anomalous
to say that this litigation may proceed as a class action and then lay down
a condition which could never be met. Notice by publication might
well be the most practicable method, both of giving notice and of
identifying members of the class." 55 However, the court in Dolgow
49FaD. R. Civ. P. 23(b) (3) is set out in the Appendix.
50 Ward and Elliott, The Contents and Mechanics of Rule 23 Notice, 10 B.C. IND. &
CoMM. L. REv. 557, 564-67 (1969) and cases there cited. But see note 53 infra.
51391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1969).
52 Id. at 570.
53 This includes, it seems, the district court in Eisen, after remand. The latest opinion
in the Eisen case determined, after remand on a preliminary hearing, that the plaintiffs
had a substantial probability of success, warranting a court order that the defendants
bear 90% of the cost of giving notice and the plaintiff bear 10%. 40 US.L.W. 2716
(April 4, 1972). Apparently the district court found an alternative, not by eliminating
individual notice, but by allocating costs.
5443 F.R.D. 472 (ED.N.Y. 1968).
55 Id. at 500.
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made no final decision on the form of notice or on who should pay for
the distribution, so the quoted language does not have the weight of a
carefully considered holding. Moreover, the matter of notice may not
be disposed of so easily if, as has been asserted, the question is essentially
one of constitutional dimensions under the due process clause.58 The
Advisory Committee seems to have taken this position when it said,
with reference to subdivision (c) (2):
This mandatory notice pursuant to subdivision (c) (2), . . . is de-
signed to fulfill requirements of due process to which the class action
procedure is of course subject. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32
(1940); Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306
(1950) .... 57
It is not clear, however, that the two Supreme Court cases cited by
the Advisory Committee inflexibly require individual notice in all cases.
In Hansberry v. Lee,58 the Court was concerned with the adequacy of
representation because the interests of the representatives were not the
same as the interests of the class members. The question of notice was
in issue only insofar as it bore on the matter of adequate representation.
The Court required only a proceeding that protected the absent parties,
and notice, in that case, was simply a way to insure that protection.
In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,59 the Court was also
faced with a situation that involved interests of representatives which
differed from the interests of the group. Mailed notice was required for
those trust beneficiaries whose names and addresses were known because
they were on an existing mailing list. Notice by publication, however,
was deemed sufficient for unknown or conjectural beneficiaries. This
result was justified on the ground that "[n] otice reasonably certain to
reach most of those interested in objecting is likely to safeguard the
interests of all, since any objection sustained would inure to the benefit
of all." '0
The standards for notice to a class derived from Hansberry and
Mullane hardly seem to be as rigid as the Advisory Committee implies.
The primary requisites are, instead, the adequacy of the representation,
56In the case of Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, at the district court level, due process
was construed to require individual notice. 41 F.R.D. 147 (SD.N.Y. 1966).
57 Advisory Committee's Note to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 98, 107 (1966).
58 311 U.S. 32 (1940).
59 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
Go ld. at 319.
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the cohesiveness of the class and the consequences of requiring individ-
ual notice.6' That some type of notice is constitutionally required can-
not be gainsaid but, as has been suggested, "many types are available
short of individual notice to every member of the class. It [the court]
could order individual notice to a random sample of the class, indi-
vidual notice to those in the class whose claims are above a certain
amount, individual notice only to those members of the class whose
names and addresses are presently available or readily ascertainable,
notice by publication, or any combination of these methods." 62 When
the cost of individual notice becomes so great that the class action
cannot be maintained if that form of notice is required, the court should
carefully consider the use of other types of notice which might be
constitutionally permissible under the circumstances of the particular
case and not simply impose individual notice out-of-hand. The lan-
guage of subdivision (c) (2) appears broad enough to encompass this
consideration, but the consumer advocate should be alert to the possi-
bility that the individual notice question will be raised, and be prepared
to show the court that some other form of notice or an allocation of
the cost of notice would satisfy the requirements of due process and
efficient management of the class action.
THE CONSUMER CLASS ACTION AND THE
"COMMON INTEREST" RULE
The final problem to be discussed regarding class suits, that seems
to be of particular relevance to lawyers contemplating a consumer class
action, is the impact of the "common interest" rule. This is a basic re-
quirement of the class action device whether common law, Field Code
or Federal Rule 23 in procedural origin. The requirement that all mem-
bers of the class share a common interest was stated by Justice Story in
his summary of the requisites for a class suit:
(1) Where the question is one of a common or general interest,
and one or more sue, or defend for the benefit of the whole;
(2) Where the parties form a voluntary association for public or
private purposes, and those, who sue, or defend, may fairly
61 As Rule 23 (c) (2) says: "In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3),
the court shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through
reasonable effort." (Emphasis added).
6 2 Kirkpatrick, Consumer Class Litigation, 50 ORE. L. REv. 21, 39 (1970).
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be presumed to represent the rights and interests of the whole;
(3) Where the parties are very numerous, and although they
have, or may have, separate distinct interests; yet it is imprac-
ticable to bring them all before the court.63
The common interest requirement can create special difficulty in
consumer cases. Typically, each consumer injured by a seller's mis-
representation or illegal overcharge, for example, will have engaged in a
transaction distinct from other transactions between the same seller
and other consumers-at least on a purely factual basis. Some courts
taking a generous view of the consumers' situation, have treated the
issue presented by a class action not as the defendant's conduct toward
each member of the class but rather whether the defendant's conduct
has been illegal. This view at least recognizes a common interest
among class members on the liability issue, leaving the damage issue to
be determined separately. It is, in effect, a way of looking at a class
action as presenting a question of law (common to all members of the
class) rather than a series of factually separate transactions (which are
not common). Cases of seller overcharges have been particularly suit-
able for such treatment.64 Not all courts, however, have been willing to
consider class action complaints in this light but rather have emphasized
the individuality of each transaction and refused to find a sufficient
"common interest" to allow a class action to proceed. 65 A classic ex-
ample of this approach is the case of Hall v. Coburn Corp. of America.6
The plaintiffs had purchased goods from several New York merchants
in separate transactions and had signed retail installment sales contracts
supplied to the merchants by the defendant financing company. The
contracts, assigned to the defendant immediately after the sales were
made, were identical. All of them violated § I of the New York Retail
63J. STORY, EoUITy PLFADrNGS § 97 (2d ed. 1840). The Field Code provisions are
very similar: [W]hen the question is one of a common or general interest of many
persons, or when the parties are very numerous and it may be impracticable to bring
them all before the court, one or more may sue or defend for the benefit of the whole.
N.Y. Laws 1849, ch. 438, § 119. Cf. FED. R. Crv. P. 23 (a).
64 E.g., Gas Serv. Co. v. Coburn, 389 F.2d 831 (10th Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds,
394 U.S. 332 (1969); Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P.2d 732, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 724 (1967); Kovarsky v. Brooklyn Union Gas Co., 279 N.Y. 304, 18 N.E.2d 287
(1938).
65 E.g., Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Gaynor v. Rocke-
feller, 15 N.Y.2d 120, 204 N.E.2d 627, 256 N.Y.S.2d 584 (1965); Society Milion Athena,
Inc. v. National Bank of Greece, 281 N.Y. 282, 22 NZE.2d 374 (1939).
6626 N.Y.2d 396,-259 N.E.2d 720, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281 "(1970).
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Installment Sales Act because substantial portions of each contract were
printed in a type size smaller than that required by the Act. 7 The New
York Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of the class action com-
plaint on the ground that the plaintiffs had not satisfied the "common
interest" requirement because "[a] number of persons made a number
of quite different and unrelated contracts with a number of different
and unrelated sellers using the same written form which is claimed to
be illegal. This does not become a common question because the same
finance company is the assignee of the contracts and prepared them for
use by the contracting parties." 6 This interpretative view can clearly
be the death knell for many otherwise well-founded class actions and
counsel should, whenever possible, urge the court to consider the issue
as a question of law instead of a question of fact to avoid this kind of
over-emphasis on the distinctness of each separate transaction.
The difficulties with the common interest requirement do not, how-
ever, stop with mere interpretive approaches. Even if a court is willing
to view the issues as questions of law arising from a repetitious pattern
of conduct, the type of wrongdoing alleged- may present uniquely
individual elements as a part of the cause of action, and prevent the
more generous interpretive approach from being used effectively. Per-
haps the most frequent example of this situation is the class action for
fraudulent misrepresentation. Because an action for fraud includes the
elements of misrepresentation and reliance on the misrepresentation,
the courts have found it difficult to reconcile the individual nature of
these elements with the requirement that the class members share a
4'common interest." " However, as Professor Starts has pointed out,
there is one group of cases in which the courts have been able to over-
come the misrepresentation problem with some consistency-the securi-
ties fraud cases. 7° The simplest of these cases are those in which the
67 The New York Retail Installment Sales Act provides, in pertinent part: "A
retail installment contract or obligation shall be dated and in writing; the printed
portion thereof shall be in at least eight point type." N.Y. PERs. PRop. LAw § 402(1)
(McKinney 1962). "In case of failure by any person to comply with the provisions
of this article, the buyer shall have the right to recover from such person an amount
equal to the credit service charge or service charge imposed and the amount of any
delinquency, collection, extension, deferred or refinance charge imposed." N.Y. PmEs.
PRoP. LAW § 414(2) (McKinney 1962).
6826 N.Y.2d 396, 400, 259 N.E2d 720, 721, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281, 282-83.
69 See cases cited in Simeone, Class Suits under the Codes, 7 W. Ras. L. REv. 5
(1955).
70 Starts, The Consumer Class Action-Part 11: Considerations of Procedure, 49
B.IJ.L. REv. 407, 423 (1969).
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same misrepresentation is made to all members of the class by writing
such as a prospectus, financial statement or other form of inducement.
Here, even a court that looked with disfavor on a class action founded
on more complex facts was willing to say that "[c]lass actions in
securities cases are maintainable where there has been a standardized
misrepresentation to a group through a prospectus, proxy statement,
financial statements or form letter . . . ," 71 Less well established, but
used at least occasionally, is the approach taken by the court in Fischer
v. Kletz72 which involved several different financial statements issued
over a two-year period. The lack of identical misrepresentations was
deemed unimportant because the different financial information pro-
vided by each statement was not "material" in its variation. In another
case involving similar, but varying misrepresentations, the court empha-
sized the common course of conduct of the defendants over a period
of time, and allowed the action to proceed.7' Like the cases of con-
sumer overcharge, the pattern or course of the defendant's conduct has
been utilized to find a common question presented on the issue of mis-
representation. 74
The reliance factor has been more difficult to resolve by reference to
the defendant's modus operandi, necessitating the use of other methods
to avoid dismissal. Perhaps the most successful approach was taken by
the plaintiffs, and apparently endorsed by the court in the case of Dol-
go'w v. Anderson,7 5 which noted:
Moreover, plaintiffs may hot even have to prove individual reliance-
the only issue that may prove to be troublesome. They are contehding
that the purchase of Monsanto stock at a price which was affected by
defendants' improper activities- constitutes sufficient reliance.
For a class of consumer plaintiffs not concerned exclusively with
damages, the reliance problem can be avoided by a complaint that seeks
injunctive relief for the class vis-4-vis the defendant and damages only
for the representatives (who must still prove their own reliance) .7
71 Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453, 462 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
7241 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
73ICroenberg v. Hotel Governor Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42 (SD.N.Y. 1966).
74 Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Fidelis Corp. v. Litton Indus.,
Inc. 293 F. Supp. 164 (SD.N.Y. 1968).
75 43 F.RD. 472,491 (ED.N.Y. 1968).
76 See generally, Starrs, The Consmner Class Action-Part 11: Considerations of
Procedure, 49 B.U.L. REv. 407 (1969).
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The prayer for an injunction against further wrongdoing of a similar
nature presents, of course, a question of law which can be determined
without the need for proof of reliance by every member of the class.
However, if the class is interested in damage recovery this method is
obviously unsatisfactory, and it may be necessary to treat reliance as a
separate issue (like damages) and require proof by every member of
the class.
In the realm of theory, the case of Harris v. Jones77 contain the seeds
of an approach that might be the most valuable of all in handling indi-
vidual issues such as reliance in large class actions, particularly if com-
bined with a suggestion recently made by Mr. Laird Kirkpatrick. In
essence, the Harris case used an opinion polling technique to obtain
information from class members on "the types and sources of repre-
sentation, if any, upon which they relied in purchasing their securities,
and the time they first learned any representations were false." 78 Mr.
Kirkpatrick suggested that:
In many consumer cases, the fact that the misrepresentations were
the inducement to purchase is so clear from the circumstances sur-
rounding each sale that something in the nature of a disputable pre-
sumption of reliance could be established that would make individual
consideration of reliance necessary only in those instances where the
defendant had evidence of nonreliance.79
It would seem quite feasible to handle such individual issues as reliance
by requiring proof by a sufficient number of class members to insure
statistical reliability and, if the proof showed the allegation to be prima
facie true, to then create a rebuttable presumption applicable to the
class as a whole. At first glance, this approach seems to do considerable
violence to our concepts of the allocation of the burden of proof and
the operation of the adversary system. However, when examined from
an evidentiary standpoint, the method seems appropriate. The defend-
ant's opportunity to challenge the plaintiffs' proof would be preserved
at the initial stage and, if unsuccessful there, the handicap would be
merely a reallocation of the burden of proof, a not uncommon phenom-
enon in many other kinds of cases today.
The basis for creating this presumption is nothing more than prob-
77 41 F.R.D. 70 (D. Utah 1966).
78 Id. at 74.
79 Kirkpatrick, Consmner Class Litigation, 50 ORE. L. REv. 21, 32 (1970).
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ability, the same as the basis for the creation of any other presumption. 0
The suggested approach simply recognizes this basis and applies it to
class suits. It operates empirically to establish the proposition that it is
more probable than not that each class member relied on the defend-
ant's misrepresentations, or that the misrepresentations were similar or
that certain damage elements are common to each plaintiff. Similar
statistical proof has become more generally accepted in recent years.81
The extension of this method to class actions, with adequate safeguards
to insure trustworthiness (including opportunity for cross-examina-
tion), would make the consumer class action a more valuable procedural
device for the resolution of disputes.
CONCLUSION
Despite numerous attempts to enact class action bills that would
directly avoid the "no-aggregation" rule of Snyder v. Harris in some
degree and make consumer class actions more directly cognizable in
the federal courts, no new legislation has come forth. 2 Even if a new
class action statute is enacted, the problems of sending "Invitations to
Come In" and the hazards of the common interest rule will continue
to be factors that the consumer advocate must consider before deciding
to bring a class suit. The class suit, however, remains as the form of
action most likely to be economically feasible for aggrieved consumers
with small claims.
80 On the reasons for creating presumptions see Morgan, Presumptions, 12 WAsH. L.
REv. 255 (1937).
81 See, e.g., United States v. 89 Cases, More or Less, 187 F.2d 967 (3d Cir. 1951),
cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951); Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp.
670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); Household Fin. Corp. v. Federal Fin. Corp., 105 F. Supp. 164 (D.
Ariz. 1952). A special section of the MANUAL FOR CoMPLEX AND MuLsminnSaer LrniA-
TioN is devoted to proof of facts in complex cases and thoroughly reviews developments
in the area of proof by statistical methods. MANUAL FOR CoMP.Ex AN MUmlnisrcr
LrIGATION, pt. 1, §§ 2.61-.617 (1970).
82 The bills include: S. 1980, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) (introduced by Senator
Tydings of Maryland); H.R. 11656, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. (1969) (introduced by Repre-
sentative Eckhardt of Texas as a companion bill to S. 1980); H.R. 5630, 92d Cong,
Ist Sess. (1971) (introduced by Representative Eckhardt of Texas); S. 1378, 92d Cong,
1st Sess. (1971) (introduced by Senator Bayh of Indiana as a companion bill to H.R.
5630); S. 984, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (introduced by Senator Magnuson of Wash-
ington); S. 1222, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. (1971) (introduced by Senator Magnuson of
Washington on behalf of the Nixon Administration).
These bills, and others, are extensively analyzed in Newberg, Federal Consumer Class
Action Legislation: Making the System Work, 9 HARv. J. LEsis. 217 (1972).
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APPENDIX
FORMER RULE 23
(Class Actions)
a. Representation. If persons constituting a class are so numerous
as to make it impracticable to bring them all before the court, such of
them, one or more, as will fairly insure the adequate representation of
all may, on behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the character of the
right sought to be enforced for or against the class is
(1) joint, or common, or secondary in the sense that the owner
of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a member of
the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it;
(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of
claims which do or may affect specific property involved in the
action; or
(3) several, and there is a common question of law or fact
affecting the several rights and a common relief is sought.
b. Secondary Action by Shareholders. In an action brought to en-
force a secondary right on the part of one or more shareholders in an
association, incorporated or unincorporated, because the association re-
fuses to enforce rights which may properly be asserted by it, the com-
plaint shall be verified by oath and shall aver (1) that the plaintiff was
a shareholder at the time of the transaction of which he complains or
that his share thereafter devolved on him by operation of law and (2)
that the action is not a collusive one to confer on a court of the United
States jurisdiction of any action of which it would not otherwise have
jurisdiction. The complaint shall also set forth with particularity the
efforts of the plaintiff to secure from the managing directors or trus-
tees and, if necessary, from the shareholders such action as he desires,
and the reasons for his failure to obtain such action or the reasons for
not making such effort.
c. Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed
or compromised without the approval of the court. If the right sought
to be enforced is one defined in paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of
this rule notice of the proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given
to all members of the class in such manner as the court directs. If the
right is one defined in paragraphs (2) or (3) of subdivision (a) notice
shall be given only if the court requires it.
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NEw RULE 23
(Class Action)
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable,
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the
claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims
or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly
-and adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a
class action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and
in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual mem-
bers of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of
conduct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of
the other members not par~ties to the adjudications or substantially
impair or impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on
grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate
final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect
to the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other avail-
able methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.
The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of
members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or de-
fense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already commenced by or against mem-
bers of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating
the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties
likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Main-
tained; Notice; Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
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(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action
brought as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it
is to be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be condi-
tional, and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the
court shall direct to the members of the class the best practicable under
the circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can
be identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each
member that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so
requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or
not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C)
any member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter
an appearance through his counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under
subdivision (b) (1) or (b) (2), whether or not favorable to the class,
shall include and describe those whom the court finds to be members
of the class. The judgment in an action maintained as a class action
under subdivision (b) (3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall
include and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided in
subdivision (c) (2) was directed, and who have not requested exclu-
sion, and whom the court finds to be members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained
as a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may
be divided into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the
provisions of this rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to
which this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1)
determining the course of proceedings or prescribing measures to pre-
vent undue repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence or
argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of the members of the
class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice be
given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the
members of any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the
judgment, or of the opportunity of members to signify whether they
consider the representation fair and adequate, to intervene and present
claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into the action; (3) imposing
conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; (4) requir-
ing that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations
as to representation of absent persons, and that the action proceed
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accordingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders
may be combined with an order under Rule 16, and may be altered or
amended as may be desirable from time to time.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed
or compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the
proposed dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the
class in such manner as the court directs. As amended Feb. 28, 1966,
eff. July 1, 1966.

